Bukele is popular because so are repression, authoritarianism, the militarization of daily life and revanchism. And all these elements are part of his leadership
Faced with the crisis of violence and governance that has erupted in recent weeks in Port-au-Prince, many leaders have expressed their opinion via social networks.
One of the publications that received a lot of attention and reactions on the social network X was that of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele.
Regarding the grip of gangs in Haiti, the president of the Central American country said: “We can solve this problem. But we will need a UN Security Council resolution, the consent of the host country and that all costs of the mission are covered.”
Screenshot of response from Bukele on facing the situation in Haiti
Let’s start with the first sentence: “We can solve this problem.”
For some time now, voices have been growing in Latin America calling for the leadership of someone like Bukele, who publicly subjugates gang members and humiliates them before military power, demonstrating the firm resolve of the state. A state that cruelly applies “necessary punishment” to lower criminal structures such as gangs.
Bukele is popular because so are repression, authoritarianism, the militarization of daily life and revanchism. And all these elements are part of his leadership.
Without a doubt, the impact of the security strategy implemented by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele is felt in the most difficult neighborhoods of the Salvadoran capital and in many residential neighborhoods and streets in the interior of the country, where living without the daily scourge of extortion, threats, and territorial control from gangs seemed like a distant, if not impossible, dream to achieve.
Without a doubt, the impact of the security strategy implemented by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele is felt in the neighborhoods…
When Bukele says “We can solve this problem,” he is referring to the Salvadoran experience, where the influence of criminal gangs was significantly reduced and state and citizen control of spaces held hostage by gangs was reestablished, although this has come at a high human cost, as the number of innocent people in prison is uncertain. Nearly 5,000 detainees were released and more than 6,000 complaints of abuse of power, torture, threats, police harassment and arbitrary arrests were filed, not to mention the deaths of innocent people recorded in prison.
Many families continue to report not knowing the fate of their loved ones in prison. Unjustified detention of young people, workers and students remains very common. We must not forget that the state of emergency has been the preferred tool in the Salvadoran experience, where laws and the fundamental rights of citizens no longer count in the determination of police power.
However, although the Salvadoran army has collaborated in pacification missions in Mali and Lebanon, it does not have the experience of leading or playing a lead role in a mission on foreign territory, in very different contexts. from El Salvador.
Read also: A look back at 15 years of UN failures in Haiti
In addition to the military arm, Bukele’s strategy in El Salvador required a solid prison infrastructure, which is lacking in Haiti, given the recent attacks on the country’s main penitentiary centers and the escape of many detainees including gang members.
Bukele’s strategy required a strong element of authoritarianism and near absolute control of power within the state, which brings us to the second part of the sentence published on X: “But we will need a resolution of the UN Security Council, the consent of the host country and that all mission costs are covered. »
In addition to the military arm, Bukele’s strategy in El Salvador required a solid prison infrastructure, which is lacking in Haiti, given recent attacks on the country’s main penitentiary centers and the escape of many common and gang inmates.
How can the Haitian leadership give its consent when it is strongly rejected by the population and has no legitimacy?
When Bukele says he needs the consent of the host country, will he take into account the government’s legitimacy crisis?
Will he take into account the fact that the crisis in Haiti is not only a crisis of insecurity, but also the disintegration of a de facto power which has governed for years while being totally rejected by the popular sectors?
Will he be aware that the young and fragile Haitian democracy has been systematically overwhelmed by external powers?
The military strategy was the basis of the restoration of public security in El Salvador, but it is not — in my opinion — sufficient to resolve the Haitian crisis, where a fundamental element of the solution must come from the Haitians themselves, who must legitimately decide who will lead the country and who can create institutions to support long-term pacification.
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This is not the first time that “pacification” missions have intervened (or offered to intervene) in Haiti. So a military effort without a realistic national democratic component is nothing more than a bandage on a gaping wound. Bukele’s formula is still young in El Salvador and its durability is being tested. Repression alone does not create citizen security.
A more modest option on Bukele’s part would be to say that “we can help resolve the crisis”, but it is well known that his leadership has messianic tendencies, that he tends to see himself as a hero and that he is also an advertising man par excellence.
The military strategy was the basis of the restoration of public security in El Salvador, but it is not — in my opinion — sufficient to resolve the Haitian crisis…
Let’s move on to the last part of the post: “We will need all mission costs to be covered. » Who benefits from widespread insecurity? Are criminal gangs and the lowest members of the hierarchy mainly responsible for Haiti’s insecurity problems?
Although Bukele undertook a merciless crackdown on the “popular” structures of Salvadoran gangs, many media outlets in my country, El Salvador, published information about his negotiations with senior gang leaders, about the release of gang leaders already convicted, as well as the links between officials in Bukele’s close circle and structures of corruption, money laundering and drug trafficking.
Just as in Haiti, in El Salvador, civil servants have been sanctioned by control institutions of third countries, without this having any real impact on the political life of these figures. It seems that Bukele’s strategy is based on a reductive vision of what insecurity is, because the involvement of major entrepreneurs and politicians and their connections to criminal gang structures appear to be off the radar of “necessary punishment.” »
That’s why when I ask, “Who pays the price for these policies?” “, I wonder what this implies, that there are great human and material costs in the popular sectors and almost no accountability of the powerful elites who have contributed to a large extent to the crisis that the country is experiencing in recent days.
In El Salvador, despite the dictatorial and fascist tendencies of Bukele’s leadership, the scourge of insecurity and gangs has been such that we continue to celebrate questionable leadership, but which still allows people to walk peacefully in the public spaces.
Par Marcela Alfonsina Colocho Rodríguez
Cover image published by AyiboPost showing the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele and two commanders of his army, in the context where head of state proposes to resolve the gang problem in Haiti | Photo of All Israel News
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