“…the country has been in an endless transition for more than 30 months…»
As the February 7 deadline for the interim prime minister’s departure approaches, Haiti faces a deepening political crisis.
The governance vacuum in Haiti, triggered by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, shows few encouraging signs. The violence, particularly around Port-au-Prince, is not only escalating in lethality, but also becoming the central issue shaping national and international discussions. The impending expiration of interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s term on February 7 means Haiti’s political crisis is poised to become more intransigent.
Claiming that the country is on the brink of collapse underestimates the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the months of hesitation among key Haitian actors and international partners highlight the need for a much more active approach from Haitian and international actors to the crisis.
Analysis of the situation
To begin with, the reference to “gang violence” underestimates the scope, structure and sociology of the problem. The near total absence of state-provided security, with only approximately 9,000 Haitian National Police (PNH) agents estimated for a population of 11.45 million, creates a vacuum where not only gangs thrive, but also private security and retaliatory justice emerge, further degrading the rule of law. This phenomenon is not limited to the capital. Although the Port-au-Prince region attracts a lot of media attention, the rest of Haiti, including agricultural communities, is also in danger of succumbing to the continued breakdown of order.
For the moment, the capacity of organized gangs (notably G9 and G-Pep) remains limited. Their success in taking and retaining territory does not so much indicate their institutional cohesion and strategy, but rather a critique of the PNH. However, it is only a matter of time before this changes. The gangs’ ambitions appear vast, as evidenced by their growing alliances and the geography of their ravages, and they are amplified as the economy collapses, fueling the sociopolitical dynamics of gang violence. Moreover, they face little prospect of resistance from the ineffective interim government led by Henry. The extreme suffering of the Haitian people and the complete failure of the government to respond to the needs of its citizens have created distrust and anger among large segments of the Haitian public.
Three Unstable Factors This toxic amalgam is now shaped by three unstable factors:
- Lack of a viable consensus governance agreement: No viable path has emerged from the various attempts to create consensus road maps out of the crisis, including the efforts of the Montana Accord, the December 21 Accord, and the two somewhat overlapping multilateral mediation initiatives, the Caribbean Community Group of Eminent Persons (CARICOM) and the Inter Mediate efforts led by Jonathan Powell. The failure to reach consensus is unfortunate and highlights both a deep distrust and short-sightedness among Haiti’s main political actors, and, arguably, a disorganized attention to the crisis on the part of Haiti’s main international partners. Haiti.
However, overall, these consensus road maps represent a serious set of proposals, including an articulation of transitional governance instruments and timetables. The problem now is time. Not only The country has been in a never-ending transition for more than 30 months, but the December 21 Accord, supported by Henry, incorporated an end to the proposed transition process – February 7, also the symbolic date of Haitian presidential transitions. The imminent expiration of Henry’s sole claim to democratic legitimacy is likely to further deepen Haiti’s political crisis.
- The Guy Philippe Postman: In late November 2023, Guy Philippe, previously imprisoned in the United States for drug trafficking, returned to Haiti, causing political unrest. Known to observers of Haitian politics for his role in the violent overthrow of Aristide’s second presidency in 2004, his ill-advised arrival in Haiti raises questions about the bureaucratic timing of U.S. politics, leaving many Haitians perplexed as to the motives. American decision-makers.
Finding fertile political ground, within weeks of his arrival, Philippe called for a national revolution and the overthrow of the interim government, creating panic in civil society. In doing so, Philippe joined previous calls from Haitian gang leaders, and also energized political opportunists – the most visible being Moïse Jean-Charles, presidential candidate in 2015 (third in ranking) and former mayor of Milot in northern Haiti and member of parliament. Ideas to overthrow Henry resonate widely for many Haitians whose daily lives are becoming increasingly unbearable, even deadly. This unsaintly coalition of disparate actors may agree on Henry’s overthrow, but it lacks a subsequent governing consensus, although paradoxically, moving toward national elections may be a common, if ill-defined, refrain . It’s dangerous.
Community-level disruptions throughout January in Port-au-Prince and several provincial capitals raise prospects for nationwide violence, as well as the precipitous collapse of what remains of the Haitian state – and none alternative solution except the hoped-for arrival of the international security mission which now faces a different mission logistically and politically.
- A multinational security support mission (MSS): Such a mission has from the beginning been seen by many in Haiti and beyond as a key element of any resolution of the crisis. Formally requested by Henry at the United Nations in October 2022, the MSS mission belatedly took shape in late summer 2023 and was formalized by a vote of the UN Security Council in October – but the timetable for the insertion of 1,000 Kenyan police and possibly 1,500 non-Kenyan forces remains fluid. Although a significant amount of behind-the-scenes work has already been done to make this happen, fundamental uncertainties remain, some related to Kenyan politics and judicial reviews.
Likewise, the prospects of other countries joining Kenya in significant numbers to make a difference remain unclear. But the most daunting challenge to deployment now may be a mutating political scenario in Port-au-Prince, and growing uncertainty about the character of the Haitian government partner with whom the MSS mission will work.
The next few weeks will be crucial. In the ensuing political-security quagmire, the temptation may be strong to explore a workaround of some sort. This could likely circumvent the issue of the need for an interim Haitian governance consensus (especially resulting from street violence), or through a sense of panic among Haitian civil society and key political actors and their international partners, develop a Fragile governing structure anchored to a timetable (probably 12 months) for national and local elections. Operationally, this would require adjustments in the scope of engagement of the MSS mission, but would also play on comfort levels, particularly among the peacekeeping mechanisms of multilateral organizations and electoral assistance.
Some Plausible Scenarios
But even the flimsy “workarounds” above run the danger of being overtaken by rapid events in Haiti. A sample of plausible, non-mutually exclusive scenarios might include the following, providing at least an idea of what to avoid and what might help.
Mediation Process 2.0
A political compromise emerges triggered by political pressures, both internal and external, and by panic resulting from recent events, and is overseen by several experienced high-level mediators (Haitian and international, including the United States). Such an agreement should include the Montana Accord coalition, the December 21 Accord, a cross-section of key political parties (PHTK, OPL, Fanmi Lavalas, En Avant, etc.) and key elements of civil society (sectors private, religious leadership), mainly anchored in an agreement on an electoral calendar and the means of achieving it. The Mediation Process 2.0 is quickly gaining support from the UN and the Organization of American States, including the latter’s electoral assistance capacity. This best-case scenario has been abandoned by some but remains viable.
Get by
A halting process that continues on the current trajectory of the United States and other key partners attempting to strengthen Haitian security and the political capacity of a weakened Henry. It may be anchored by an expanded international security mission (Kenya plus others), but is compromised by the precarious funding status of the US Congress. The uncertainty generated by such an ad hoc approach is likely to escalate toward more controversial outcomes and poses additional risks to the incoming international security force.
The Bukele Model
A consensus emerges to move directly to elections, supported by international technical and financial support, but is ultimately hijacked by populist support for candidates advocating a security repression in the style of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Generic campaign promises about restoring order and reviving the economy are propelling a controversial presidential candidate. This could generate sympathetic support from other countries facing violent groups, but could also push Haiti into another cycle of increased violence, as this approach relies on a general suspension of human rights and state capacity Haitian government is too weak to effectively execute such a model without significant international assistance.
Large-Scale International Intervention
Whether it occurs within a short period of time (February 7, 2024) or at an unspecified time later in 2024, the Henry government (or a faltering successor) is violently overthrown, unleashing chaos in major cities. Assuming deployment of the MMS mission has occurred, it is quickly overwhelmed by massive waves of population displacement. Regionally, this impacts the Dominican Republic (perhaps ahead of national elections in May) and beyond (including the United States). Reluctantly, the United States assembles a coalition of partners for security/humanitarian intervention. Lately, these events may merge with some of the scenarios above.
Conclusion
Faced with the complex challenges facing Haiti, it is imperative that the United States, alongside international partners, take a multi-faceted approach to supporting Haiti focused on security and governance.
First, the United States should work with international partners to strengthen the mission MSS, ensuring that it is equipped to deal with the evolving security and political landscape. This would involve a clear roadmap for deployment, increased technical support for the mission and additional elements missing from the force as envisioned in the areas of intelligence, heavy components and gang diversion.
Second, alongside the security reset, the United States should recognize its unique position as the only actor capable of bringing all Haitian stakeholders to the negotiating table and ensuring that they remain in the negotiation until ‘until a viable governance agreement is reached, opening the path to a stable transition and credible elections. In this regard, The United States should facilitate a Mediation Process 2.0 to support a Haitian-led solution whose objective is peace and prosperity achieved by democratic means. Any other approach risks trapping Haiti in a continuous cycle of violence.
Georges Fauriol is a senior advisor to the Latin America Program of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
version originale
Wanted: A Reset of Haiti Policy
As February 7 deadline for interim prime minister’s exit approaches, Haiti faces a deepening political crisis.
Haiti’s governance vacuum triggered by President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021 shows few encouraging signs. Violence, notably around Port-au-Prince, has not only grown in lethality, but politically has become the central issue shaping domestic and international discussions. The imminent expiration of acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s term in office on February 7 means Haiti’s political crisis is on course to become more intransigent.
To suggest that the country is at a breaking point understates the gravity of the situation — in fact, the months of dithering among key Haitian stakeholders and international partners point to the need for a far more active approach by both Haitian and international actors to the crisis.
Understanding the Problem
For starters, the reference to “gang violence” misjudges the scope, structure and sociology of the problem. The near absence of state-provided security, with as few as an estimated 9,000 Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haïti; PNH) officers for a population of 11.45 million, creates a void where not only gangs flourish but also private security and vigilante justice emerges, further degrading the rule of law. Nor is this phenomenon limited to the capital. While the Port-au-Prince area gets much of the media attention, the rest of Haiti, including farming communities, are at risk of succumbing to the ongoing collapse of law and order.
For now, the capacity of organized gangs (notably G9 and G-Pep) remains limited. Their success in seizing and holding territory is less an indicator of their own institutional cohesion and strategy, and more an indictment of the PNH. However, it is only a matter of time before that changes. The gangs’ ambitions appear to be large, as indicated by their expanding alliances and geography of rampage, and growing, as the collapsing economy energizes the sociopolitical dynamics of gang violence. Moreover, they face little prospect of resistance from the ineffectual interim government led by Henry. The extreme suffering of the Haitian people and the total failure of the government to respond to its citizens’ needs has created distrust and anger among large segments of the Haitian public.
Three Unstable Factors
This toxic mix is now being shaped by three unstable factors:
1) Lack of a viable consensus governance agreement: No viable way forward has emerged from the various attempts to create consensus road maps out of the crisis — these include, most notably, the efforts of the Montana Accord, the 21 December Agreement and the two somewhat overlapping multilateral mediation efforts, the Cari9bbean Community’s (CARICOM’s) Eminent Persons Group and the efforts of Inter Mediate led by Jonathan Powell. The failure to achieve consensus is unfortunate and underscores both profound distrust and shortsightedness among key Haitian political actors — and, arguably, disjointed attention to the crisis from Haiti’s key international partners.
Nonetheless, in the aggregate these consensus road maps represent a serious body of proposals, including an articulation of transitional governance instrumentalities and timetables. The problem now is time. Not only is the country in a never-ending, 30-plus month transition, but the Henry-allied December 21 Agreement incorporated an endpoint to the proposed transition process — February 7, also the symbolic date of Haitian presidential transitions. The looming expiration of Henry’s only claim to democratic legitimacy is likely to further deepen Haiti’s political crisis.
2) The Guy Philippe factor: In late November 2023, Guy Philippe, previously jailed in the United States on trafficking charges, returned to Haiti stirring political unrest. Known to observers of Haitian politics for his role in the violent ouster of the second Aristide presidency in 2004, his ill-timed arrival in Haiti raises questions about the bureaucratic synchronization of U.S. policy, and has left many in Haiti perplexed about the motives of U.S. policymakers.
Finding fertile political ground, within several weeks of his arrival Philippe was calling for a national revolution and the ouster of the interim government, and in the process creating panic in civil society. In so doing Philippe joined previous calls originating with Haiti’s gang leaders, and in turn also energized political opportunists — the most visible example being Moïse Jean-Charles, a presidential candidate in 2015 (who came in third) and former mayor of Milot in northern Haiti and member of parliament. Notions of ousting Henry resonate broadly for many Haitians whose daily life is increasingly unbearable, if not deadly. This unholy coalition of disparate actors may agree on Henry’s ouster but lack a follow-on governance consensus — although paradoxically moving toward national elections may be a common, if ill-defined, refrain. This is dangerous.
Community-level disturbances throughout January in Port-au-Prince and across several provincial capitals open up prospects for nationwide violence, as well as the precipitous collapse of what is left of the Haitian state — and no plan “B” except the hoped-for arrival of the international security mission now facing a different mission logistically and politically.
3) A multinational security support (MSS) mission: Such a mission has all along been seen by many in Haiti and beyond as a core element to any resolution of the crisis. Formally requested by Henry at the United Nations in October 2022, the MSS mission belatedly took shape in late summer 2023 and was formalized by a U.N. Security Council vote in October — yet the timetable for the insertion of 1,000 Kenyan police and possibly 1,500 non-Kenyan forces remains fluid. Although a fair amount of behind-the-scenes work has already been achieved in making this operation a reality, fundamental uncertainties remain; some are within Kenyan politics and judicial reviews.
Likewise, the prospects of other countries joining Kenya in significant numbers to make a difference remain ill defined. But the most formidable challenge to the deployment may now be a mutating political scenario in Port-au-Prince, and a broadening uncertainty as to the character of the Haitian governmental partner the MSS mission will be working with.
The next several weeks will be critical. In the ensuing political-security quagmire, the temptation may be strong to explore a workaround of sorts. This would probably entail bypassing the question of the need for an interim Haitian governance consensus (particularly one ensuing from street violence), or out of a sense of panic among Haitian civil society and key political stakeholders and their international partners, cobbling together a fragile governing structure anchored to a calendar (probably 12 months) for national and local elections. Operationally, this would require adjustments in the MSS mission’s scope of engagement but also play to the comfort levels particularly among multilateral organizations’ peacekeeping and election assistance machinery.
Some Plausible Scenarios
But even the above tenuous “workarounds” run the danger of being outflanked by fast-moving events in Haiti. A sample of plausible and not mutually exclusive scenarios might include the following, providing at least some sense of what to avoid and what would help.
Mediation Process 2.0
A political compromise emerges triggered by political pressures, both internal and from the U.S. government, and panic ensuing from recent events, and is shepherded by several high-profile experienced mediators (Haitian and international to include the United States). Such an agreement would need to include the Montana Accord constituency, December 21 Agreement, a cross-section of key political parties (PHTK, OPL, Fanmi Lavalas, En Avant, etc.) and key elements of civil society (private sectors, religious leadership) mostly anchored to an agreement about an electoral calendar and the machinery to make it happen; Mediation Process 2.0 quickly gains support from the U.N. and Organization of American States, including the latter’s electoral assistance capacity. This best-case scenario has been abandoned by some but is still viable.
Muddling Through
A wobbly process that continues on the current course of the United States and other key partners attempting to shore up Haitian security and political capacity for a weakened Henry. It may be anchored by an enlarged (Kenya plus others) international security mission but is jeopardized by the tenuous status of U.S. congressional funding. The uncertainty generated by such an ad hoc approach is likely to degenerate toward more controversial outcomes and brings added risks to the incoming international security force.
The Bukele Model
A consensus emerges to move straight to elections, supported by international technical support and funding, but is ultimately highjacked by populist support for candidates advocating for a security crackdown in the vein of El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele. Generic campaign promises about restoring law and order and reenergizing the economy vault a controversial candidate into the presidency. This might generate some sympathetic support from other countries facing violent groups but may also push Haiti into another cycle of heightened violence, as the approach relies on broad suspension of human rights and the Haitian state’s capacity is too weak to effectively execute such a model without significant international assistance.
Full-Scale International Intervention
Whether occurring on a short timetable (Feb. 7, 2024) or at an indeterminate moment later in 2024, the Henry government (or a wobbly successor) is violently overthrown triggering mayhem in major cities. Assuming the MMS mission deployment has occurred, it is quickly overwhelmed by massive waves of population displacements. Regionally, this impacts the Dominican Republic (possibly on the eve of national elections in May) and beyond (including the United States). Reluctantly, the United States rallies a coalition of partners for a security/humanitarian intervention. Belatedly, these events may merge with some of the above scenarios.
Conclusion
In light of the complex challenges facing Haiti, it is imperative that the United States, alongside international partners, adopts a multifaceted approach to support Haiti th at is focused on security and governance.
First, the United States should work with international partners to strengthen the MSS mission, ensuring it is equipped to handle the evolving security and political landscape. This would entail a clear road map for deployment, increased technical support for the mission and additional enablers that are missing from the force as envisioned in the areas of intelligence, heavy components and gang diversion.
Second, alongside the security reset, the United States should recognize its unique position as the only actor capable of bringing all Haitian stakeholders to the table and ensuring they remain in the negotiation until a viable governance agreement is reached that paves the way for a stable transition and credible elections. In this capacity, the United States should facilitate a Mediation Process 2.0 to support a Haitian-led solution whose aim is peace and prosperity achieved through democratic means. Any other approach risks a Haiti trapped in a continuing cycle of violence.
Georges Fauriol is a senior advisor with the Latin America program at USIP.
Wanted: A Reset of Haiti Policy | United States Institute of Peace (usip.org)
